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Abstract—Advances in Information and Communication 
Technologies have the potential to improve many facets of 
modern healthcare service delivery. The implementation of 
electronic health records systems is a critical part of an eHealth 
system. Despite the potential gains, there are several obstacles 
that limit the wider development of electronic health record 
systems. Among these are the perceived threats to the security 
and privacy of patients’ health data, and a widely held belief that 
these cannot be adequately addressed.  
We hypothesise that the major concerns regarding eHealth 
security and privacy cannot be overcome through the 
implementation of technology alone. Human dimensions must be 
considered when analysing the provision of the three 
fundamental information security goals: confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. A sociotechnical analysis to establish the 
information security and privacy requirements when designing 
and developing a given eHealth system is important and timely. A 
framework that accommodates consideration of the legislative 
requirements and human perspectives in addition to the 
technological measures is useful in developing a measurable and 
accountable eHealth system. Successful implementation of this 
approach would enable the possibilities, practicalities and 
sustainabilities of proposed eHealth systems to be realised. 
Keywords—Information Security, Privacy, Electronic Health 
Record, Sociotechnical, Information Accountability, eHealth 
 
I. 	INTRODUCTION 
The term eHealth is generally used to refer to the 
application of information and communication technologies in 
the delivery of different types of healthcare services; or more 
directly, for the communication, sharing, retention and 
disposal of health information. An important application of 
healthcare information technology (HIT) is the provision of 
electronic health records (EHRs). The idea of EHRs is not 
new: EHRs in one form or another have been around for over 
five decades [1]. However, recent rapid advances in 
information technology; especially the development and 
widespread adoption of mobile electronic devices such as 
web-enabled smart phones, mobile devices and Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDAs); have changed the means by which 
the records can be accessed, the methods for processing the 
stored data, and stakeholder expectations regarding the 
persons who can and should have access to certain types of 
records.  
In comparison to earlier paper-based health records 
systems, EHR system offer substantial benefits. Paper based 
records systems involve physical document storage in various 
locations, so information retrieval can be cumbersome and 
complex. However, EHRs have the potential for fast recovery, 
even if they are stored at a remote location. Also, with 
appropriate metadata, EHRs are more easily searchable. The 
potential application of data mining and context sensitive 
information retrieval techniques (e.g., natural language 
processing and extractions) to systems of EHRs offers further 
benefits. These include the potential to develop new care 
delivery models; performance reporting; and public health 
surveillance such as healthcare information exchange (HIE) 
[2]. The use of EHR and HIE are vital in sustainable 
healthcare delivery systems. 
Although the potential benefits of a comprehensive 
EHR system are substantial, there are a number of challenges 
in establishing such a system [3]. For many stakeholders, 
information security and privacy are major areas of concern. 
Moreover, these concerns are especially significant in relation 
to the emergence of shared electronic health record (SEHR) 
systems, where information no longer resides within a single 
organisation. In such a situation, it is unclear how the legal 
obligations to provide appropriate protection for EHRs will be 
applied.  
In this paper we explore issues related to securing 
SEHR systems in Australia from a sociotechnical perspective. 
We consider the perspectives of various stakeholders: patients, 
health professionals and privacy advocates in postulating a 
‘context sensitive health informatics’ perspective. This allows 
information security and privacy measures to be understood as 
‘human factors’ when implementing eHealth initiatives. 
II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR EHRs  
‘Privacy’ is not a clearly defined concept, being subject to 
a number of culturally-dependent variables. In the context of 
EHRs, the primary concern is with the aspect of privacy 
referred to as ‘information privacy’ – a term which refers to 
the ability of an individual to exercise control over their 
personal data held by others. Information privacy concerns the 
collection, maintenance, use and disclosure of ‘personal 
information’: the information items that disclose the existence 
and identity of an individual or which could identify an 
individual. Examples of personal information include names, 
addresses, date of birth, medical records, bank account details 
and unique clinical identifiers such as the biological and/or 
physiological information of individuals.  
Clearly ‘health information’ is a particularly sensitive 
subset of personal information, thus justifying the privacy 
concerns relating to the emergence of SEHR systems. In many 
countries, information privacy has been the subject of 
legislative regulation  - generally in the context of personal 
information held within public and private sector 
organisations.  
In Australia for instance, the federal Privacy Act 1988[4] 
established privacy principles governing data collection, use 
and disclosure, as well as data quality and data security by 
public and most private sector organisations, including health 
service providers. In relation to data security, the privacy 
principles impose obligations on record holders to take 
reasonable steps to protect all personal information in their 
possession from misuse and loss and from unauthorised 
access, modification or disclosure. New reforms to the 
legislation, to take effect in 2014, will broaden and consolidate 
the privacy principles and enhance the regulatory functions of 
the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
(OAIC). 
Dealing particularly with data breaches concerning 
personal information, there is currently no specific reporting 
obligation under the Privacy Act 1988 – the issue being dealt 
with by the OAIC in terms of what the privacy principles 
require in taking "reasonable steps" to protect data – usually 
notifying affected individuals to allow steps to be taken to 
mitigate the potential harm caused by a breach. However, the 
2014 amendments will establish a regime for the mandatory 
reporting of serious data breaches as a result of loss, 
unauthorised access to, or disclosure of personal information 
and which result in a real risk of serious harm to the data 
subject as a result of the breach.   
Alongside the general measures contained within the 
Privacy Act 1988 which apply to both the public and private 
sector, specific federal data protection measures concerning 
shared electronic health records have also been enacted. The 
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 
(Cth.) (PCEHR Act) operates in conjunction with the Health 
Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth) by creating an electronic 
information repository of health records organised by 
reference to unique health identifiers allocated to Australian 
citizens. The PCEHR Act creates a statutory obligation to 
report an unauthorised collection, use or disclosure of health 
information or an event which may compromise the security or 
integrity of the PCEHR system. 
Concerns about the security of information are 
traditionally expressed in terms of maintaining three 
characteristics of the information: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Providing for confidentiality means ensuring no 
unauthorised disclosure of information occurs. Integrity 
assurance involves a level of trust in the accuracy of the 
presented information; that it has not been subject to 
unauthorised modifications. Availability is the characteristic 
that information is provided to authorised users when needed. 
All of these are important for EHRs. The data security 
provisions, referred to above, clearly require a record holder to 
provide all three characteristics for EHRs and SEHRs. 
In addressing the provision of data security services for 
information assets, it is necessary to consider the state of the 
information: is it in storage, in transmission (being transferred 
from place to place) or in use (being processed)? Each of the 
requirements (confidentiality, integrity and availability) 
should be considered for each possible information state. The 
appropriate mechanisms for securing information differ 
depending on the information state. 
When considering possible measures to secure information 
in various states, technological solutions are frequently 
proposed. For example, it may be considered necessary to 
encrypt information during transmission in order to preserve 
confidentiality. Many people consider the provision of 
information security as solely a technical problem. However, 
the threats to information security are not restricted to 
technological sources, and so they cannot be fully addressed 
using only technology. It is also important to consider the 
interactions between people and information systems. 
Additional security measures relate to two aspects of this 
interaction: the policy and practices related to information 
management; and the education, training and awareness of all 
stakeholders in the security implications of potential actions.  
The three characteristics of information, the three states of 
information and three classes of security measures form the 
basis of an information security framework [6]. A visual 
representation of this is based on considering the 
characteristics, the states and the security measures as 
different dimensions. Considered together, the three 
dimensions form a cube, as shown in Figure 1. It is useful to 
apply this framework to information security for EHRs, to 
ensure all aspects of security are considered. 
Applying this to EHRs, we first consider information 
security aspects for information in storage. To understand the 
security position, how and where EHRs will be stored must be 
determined. For the stored records, consideration must be 
given to who will be granted access to the stored records, and 
what sort of access will be given. For example, for some users 
and certain fields, access may be read-only, whereas others 
may be able to write to or alter records. Policy regarding the 
record format, storage and access requirements must be 
established. The implementation of this and allowable practice 
must be established. Finally, education and training for all 
EHR users will be necessary, to ensure that the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of stored records is not compromised 
by their actions. This is especially difficult in the 
implementation of large-scale schemes; as the user population 
is far from homogenous with respect to characteristics such as 
technical literacy; and access to and willingness to interact 
with digital technologies. Even within patient subgroups; such 
as minors, mental health patients, elderly persons, there are 
diverse levels of capability. 
Other aspects to establish include defining the actions that 
are not permitted. How would a breach be determined? Who 
will be held responsible if the security is breached? From the 
technical side, to answer these questions logging and 
monitoring of all access will be required. This requires 
authentication of all users to enable accountability. This 
cannot be successful without the informed participation of all 
users. There are also associated legal issues, which are 
discussed in Section III and IV respectively.  
 
Fig. 1. Security measures for Information Dimensions[6] 
When considering access to EHRs, if remote access to 
stored records is permitted, it is necessary to consider how the 
information will be transmitted between the repository and the 
user. What security measures can be implemented? What is 
the policy regarding information transmission, and what level 
of education and training of users is required to ensure this 
will not be compromised? For example, if the transmission is 
over insecure public networks such as the Internet, encryption 
will be necessary in order to ensure confidentiality. This 
involves the use of algorithms and secret keys. The use of 
resource-constrained devices (mobile phones, PDA’s) for 
communications restricts the algorithm and key size choices. 
Also, compromise of the EHR system is possible if a user 
communicates with an insecure device; for example, a phone 
which has been infected with malware in a user downloaded 
application.  
The final category of information states is information 
being processed; that is, in active use. To use information 
effectively it must be in plaintext (unencrypted) form. 
Confidentiality cannot be provided through the commonly 
used technological measures. Policy and practice and the 
training, education and awareness of users will be fundamental 
in maintaining security. 
Many aspects of the implementation of EHR systems must 
be carefully considered in order to provide reasonable 
protection for personal information. Security is generally 
considered as a ‘weakest link’ problem, so the system cannot 
be considered to be secure unless all aspects are dealt with 
adequately. Given the diversity among stakeholders, many 
people consider this unlikely to be achieved, hence the 
continuing concerns over information privacy. 
An alternative perspective on EHRs is to consider the 
implementation of EHR systems as an opportunity to achieve 
security and privacy protection that is greater than that 
available in previous paper-based systems [7], through the 
provision of additional functionality. This includes user 
authentications and authorisations, the retention of back-up 
files, user defined storage and retrievals and accountability 
measures, monitoring and logging access to records, and 
establishing audit trails and other mechanisms to enable 
information accountability [8]. Many of these measures are 
almost impossible to achieve at scale in paper-based systems. 
Appropriate access control measures can enable the potential 
benefits of SEHRs to be obtained while also addressing 
stakeholder concerns regarding security and privacy. 
However, it is important to realise this requires a much more 
comprehensive approach than an attempt to add on 
technological security measures to an incompletely specified 
and evolving EHR system. There are research challenges in 
providing the additional functionality while addressing the 
security risks associated with human behaviour through 
developing context sensitive sociotechnical approaches. 
Clearly, the diversity of the user population will require a 
range of strategies and incentives to deliver appropriate 
services for particular contexts. 
III. LEGAL CONCERNS FOR EHRs  
Governments in the US, UK, Canada and Australia have 
spent billions of dollars recently on technical aspects of 
eHealth implementation [9]. Yet the development of 
appropriate legal regulatory regimes for EHR systems, and in 
particular for SEHR systems, is still in its infancy. Resolving 
this in one country does not necessarily provide a global 
solution as privacy is a concept with cultural and policy 
variations [10]. 
Developing an appropriate legal and/or regulatory regime 
is necessary to ensure a basis for information accountability. 
However, despite recent legal initiatives concerning SEHRs, 
such as those outlined earlier, challenges remain.   It is not 
always clear, for example, in an SEHR system, who or which 
entity owns or controls the records and thus where ultimate 
legal responsibility for information privacy resides. As well as 
this, coherent policies to guide the development of the 
information architecture are necessary to underpin effective 
implementation of the relevant systems. Appropriate co-
ordination of measures relating to the various stakeholders 
(patients, healthcare providers, other data sources), requires 
consideration of a number of factors. Particular factors, such 
as the model of ‘patient consent’ embodied in a SEHR system, 
may be critical in shaping the ultimate system of legal 
regulation [11 & 12]. 
A practical approach to tackle information security and 
privacy challenges around SEHRs, EHR and eHealth in 
general, is to consider an eHealth system that is embedded 
with appropriate, effective and manageable information 
security and privacy measures and augmented by 
Accountable-eHealth system (AeH) protocols [12 & 13]. 
Contemplation of these measures should occur at the 
beginning of the design and development stages. 
Information accountability (IA) is a concept focused on 
appropriate-use of and after-the-fact accountability for 
information usage. Transparency and the presence of 
accountability mechanisms are necessary to build trust in the 
system and are also expected to act as a deterrent for 
intentional misuse. eHealth systems built to follow the 
principles of IA are called Accountable-eHealth (AeH) 
systems [13]. Figure 2 illustrates the role of IA in the eHealth 
domain. In this scenario, observe how patients’ healthcare 
information might flow in the eHealth environment.  
 
 
Fig 2. eHealth Scenario[8] 
The flow of information between the professional and 
public domains must be monitored to control the way in which 
data is used by HCPs, and to assure the public of the security 
of their sensitive information. The monitoring mechanism can 
be implemented as an information accountability framework 
(IAF). The three main aspects of the IAF: Legal, Social and 
Technological and their interrelationships are shown in 
Figures 3. 
 
Fig 3. Information Accountability Framework[12] 
Accountable eHealth systems rely on appropriate 
legislation for the governance and regulatory mechanisms to 
be established. A case study of the Australian eHealth system 
identified that, in its current state, the existing Australian legal 
foundations are inadequate for implementing the regulatory 
mechanisms necessary for AeH systems to function as 
intended [12]. In Australia, the Federal Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
states the principal measures relating to information privacy. 
However, the effective development of AeH systems in the 
Australian context depends upon the establishment of an 
appropriate underlying legal framework to adequately address 
a range of specific issues including information ownership, 
access and control, data breach notification and broader issues 
involved in the legal management of the system as a whole.  
The recent enactment of the Personally Controlled 
Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth.) to operate in 
conjunction with the Health Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth), is 
designed to address these issues by creating an electronic 
information repository of health records organised by 
reference to unique health identifiers allocated to Australian 
citizens. Along with recent amendments to the Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth), introducing measures such as mandatory data 
breach notifications; these developments provide a more 
comprehensive legal foundation for the emergence of an 
effective AeH system. These are advances but the 
implementation issues remain unresolved. 
IV. eHEALTH PROCESSES AND PROTOCOLS  
While the process of converting existing physical health 
documents and medical records to digital versions or copies 
has begun, the development of effective large scale systems of 
EHRs is still a long way off. Public awareness and acceptance 
of EHRs is limited and the involvement of professionals (such 
as clinicians and healthcare decision makers) in this EHR 
journey varies around the globe. In many places, the owners or 
custodians of the medical/health data and information (e.g., 
PCEHR or PHR, EMR and EHR) are not yet clearly 
identified. It is important that a physical person (e.g., human) 
is responsible for the contents of the digital document (e.g, 
EHR, EMR & PHR). The integrity and non-repudiation of 
these EHR documents and/or processes may be affected by the 
actions of the responsible person. Addressing this represents 
an ongoing challenge in both HIT policy and the related 
legislative debate. 
In general, information processing and timely information 
exchange is important in disseminating quality information to 
enable effective and efficient clinical decision making. In the 
digital healthcare setting, information sharing at the individual 
and institutional levels is critical to enable valid informed 
clinical decisions making. At the same time, as noted in 
section III, sharing health information and extending access to 
personal records presents a risk; there are security and privacy 
concerns and legal challenges that must first be addressed. The 
relationship between the benefits and the risks can be 
indirectly measured on the basis of trust between healthcare 
professionals and the public.  
To better understand the information flow between public 
and professionals in a given eHealth scenario, we present a 
graphical view of SEHR in a sociotechnical perspective, by  
integrating a human dimension (Figure 4). This graphical 
depiction has global application, without prejudicing country 
specific legal and/or legislative protocols. 
 
Fig 4. Graphical view of SEHR in sociotechnical perspective [15] 
While there is no universally accepted definition for the 
term eHealth, an EHR is the building block of an eHealth 
system, combined with personal health records (PHR) and 
other aspects, these PHRs are referenced as Personally 
Controlled EHR (PCEHR), and electronic medical records 
(EMR). The relationship between PHRs, EMRs and EHRs is a 
complex data structure. However, the use of an IAF to monitor 
the information security and privacy aspects, together with 
legislative requirements should provide sufficient scope for 
the inclusion of human aspects and behaviours. 
PHR: is recognisable, individual information stored, collected, 
shared and controlled by individual (the public view) 
EMR: is amended, updated PHRs that managed by authorised 
clinicians and healthcare organisation (the professional view). 
We argue that an eHealth system should be designed to 
support improved healthcare services and/or to enhance the 
quality of clinical decision making processes. Such an eHealth 
system should consider the “critical pivotal point” 
(intersection of PHR, EMR, EHR and IAF, marked as Ω in 
Figure 4), seriously, from the outset of system design and 
development. We observe and hypothesise, such 
interconnections comprise with human behaviour, information 
flow, [for example, the state of the information: is it in 
storage, in transmission (being transferred from place to place) 
or in use (being processed)], and information accountability 
measures are aspects the majority of eHealth systems have 
failed to address [16]. 
A number of different regulatory models exist in relation 
to the privacy and security of EHR data and information – 
evident, for example, in the Health Information Technology 
for Economical and Clinical Health Act 2009 [17]; the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); the 
European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, as well as 
various specific legislative initiatives. While regulation is 
important, accountability requires the implementation and use 
of certain technical approaches; symmetric key and/or 
asymmetric key schemes, pseudo anonymity techniques in 
EHR systems, digital signature scheme based on PKI (Public 
Key Infrastructure) where the ID and key are bound with 
digital certificates; use of a PIN or biometric measures. The 
security of all of these measures depends on the interaction of 
people with the technology. These human dimensions are 
critical and helpful with sociotechnical validity. 
 
V. DISCUSSION  
In summary, health information exchange (HIE) is a 
powerful tool [2] with the capacity to make a significant and 
positive difference in healthcare delivery. At the same time, it 
depends upon an appropriate legal regime, valid information 
and privacy measures, and the deployment of strategies to deal 
with human factors to strike the correct balance in 
relationships between the relevant institutions and individuals 
themselves, and ensure that individuals are not disempowered. 
Sustainable healthcare processes must take account of and 
effectively manage the risks concerning the privacy and 
security of the relevant information. 
We presented an argument that technology, social and 
legal aspects (Figure 3) using human involvement must be 
considered when designing and developing eHealth systems. 
The juxtaposition for our hypothesis is based on 
sociotechnical perspective and possibilities for implementing 
secure eHealth system.  Different countries will have different 
legislative approaches. Ultimately, however, the evolution of 
appropriate and sustainable EHR and eHealth systems requires 
a collective and integrated approach based on appropriate 
policies, and accountability measures. Implementing 
appropriate information accountability measures requires 
specific attention to the data use agreement, in particular, the 
control of information access. The way forward lies in 
recognising and addressing the issue as “context sensitive” 
processes involving  “human factors.”  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
This paper explores issues related to information privacy 
in the context of measures being adopted for shared EHR 
systems in Australia.  
EHR and SEHR systems must be designed so as to 
enhance security and minimise breaches. This is especially so 
in the case of SEHR systems where issues of access and use 
accentuate security concerns. Despite legislative initiatives 
designed to enhance security and minimise breaches, such as 
those outlined earlier, the integrity of records cannot be 
achieved through the application of technology alone and is 
especially difficult in large-scale schemes with a diverse user 
populations. 
We approach these issues from a sociotechnical approach -  
considering the perspectives of various stakeholders: patients, 
health professionals and privacy advocates in order to form a 
‘context sensitive health informatics’ perspective. This 
approach is based on understanding information security and 
privacy measures as ‘human factors’ when implementing 
eHealth scenarios.  
 
In this context, important issues concerning SEHR systems 
includes such matters as who owns or controls the records or 
where the ultimate legal responsibility for information privacy 
resides. The development of an appropriate legal or regulatory 
regime to deal with shared records is necessary in order to 
enable information accountability mechanisms to be 
developed. Information accountability mechanisms which 
monitor user actions and compare the information flow with 
defined appropriate usage models are envisaged as a deterrent 
to intentional misuse. In other words, there are three main 
aspects of the Information Accountability framework: Legal, 
Social and Technological. The interrelationship of these must 
also be considered.   
 
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
The challenges concerning the emergence of EHR and 
SEHR systems centre on ensuring a regime sufficiently 
capable of utilising the technological benefits involved in 
accessing and sharing electronic records which also embodies 
sufficiently enhanced security measures. Developing a 
workable access and accountability framework is 
interconnected with the adoption of appropriate legal measures 
of regulation. For the most part, the legal initiatives 
undertaken thus far remain untested. The extent to which they 
sufficiently address the challenge of EHR and SEHR systems 
remains to be seen as a matter requiring future study. 
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